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THESIS

THE EFFICACY OF U.S. AND U.S.S.R.
ARMS TRANSFERS FOR THE MAINTENANCE
OF REGIME STABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

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September 1990

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The Efficacy of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Arms Transfers
for the Maintenance of Regime Stability in the Third World

by

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers to Third World nations and its effects on the maintenance of regime stability was examined. This study uses the focused comparison approach to examine three U.S. cases (Vietnam 1960-1975, the Philippines 1950-1989, and El Salvador 1960-1989) and three U.S.S.R. cases (Afghanistan 1950-1989, Vietnam 1976-1989, and Nicaragua 1979-1989). The U.S. and the Soviet cases were chosen due to the intuitive similarities found in the supplier nation's involvement with the recipient Third World nation. The trend in the amounts of arms transfers was determined in each of the cases and compared to the resulting levels of internal threat, external threat, and overall level of regime stability.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this thesis is to compare U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers, specifically focusing on the effect on the maintenance of regime stability in the recipient nation. A vital aspect of U.S. and U.S.S.R. relationships with other nations is the transfer of arms and in some cases sustained military presence in the recipient nation. It appears that much of U.S. and Soviet support centers on the belief that continued military presence and continued arms transfers to foreign governments preserves the recipient nation's political stability and national security.

Recent world events continue to show the volatility of many regimes. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have invested heavily in economic and military aid to several third world nations in pursuit of national interests. These national interests may include but are not limited to securing strategic access, maintaining influence within the recipient nation and the region, and fostering ideological institutions. In a brief review of the existing literature there appears to be some cases where arms transfers and the maintenance of regime stability are correlated [Ref. 1]. However, the broad nature and extent of this correlation is unclear. This paper by examining specific cases will seek

to reveal in a broad scope the efficacy of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers for the maintenance of regime stability in the third world.

A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REGIME STABILITY

From 1957-1973 the United States provided aid to Jordan. During this period Jordan was experiencing external conflicts and much internal upheaval. The arms that the United States supplied satisfied the demands of the military faction within Jordan. The military wanted arms in order to maintain their identity and self-respect as the defenders of the nation against both foreign and domestic enemies. With U.S. arms the military maintained their support for the monarchy and their loyalty to the King. This maintained regime stability in Jordan. [Ref. 1: p. 189, 203]

The United States has long maintained support to the Republic of Korea. This support included financial aid, arms transfers, and a sustained presence of U.S. combat forces. The U.S. relationship with South Korea has allowed its regimes to survive a war and a long uneasy truce with North Korea. [Ref. 2]

The United States relationship with Jordan and the Republic of Korea demonstrates that one result of arms transfers can be the maintenance of regime stability. These cases represented different time frames, geographic regions, economic considerations, and military circumstances for both

the supplier and the recipient nation. These cases seem to share a significant common factor in that the United States had a vested interest in not letting the regimes fall.

It is necessary to explore the concept of regime stability. The question must be asked: "Why are both the United States and the Soviet Union, as supplier nations, interested in the maintenance of regime stability in their recipient third world nations?"

After World War II the bi-polar structure of the international environment influenced the direction of U.S. policy toward economic aid and military support towards the third world [Ref. 3]. The focus of U.S. aid to the third world was sustained economic growth and development. The embodiment of all of these goals toward the third world was found in the 1984 Kissinger Commission on Central America:

- The elimination of the climate of violence and strife.
 - Development of democratic institutions and processes.
 - Development of strong and free economies.
 - Development of diversified production for both external and domestic markets.
 - Sharp improvements in the social conditions of the poorest Central Americans.
 - Substantially improved distribution of income.
- [Ref. 4]

Numerous empirical analyses have been conducted regarding the relationship between the political system and economic development. It appears that there is a tradeoff between the political system in use and the achievement of U.S. aid goals. Some studies reveal that if a less developed

country is going to achieve a high rate of economic growth, it will have to have a development-oriented authoritarian regime. This implies that more democratic governments will simply be too "soft" and consequently be unable to effectively mobilize resources to achieve a high growth rate. Two cases that illustrate this idea are found in the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. Both have maintained authoritarian regimes and have developed rapidly in their respective capitalist and socialist systems. [Ref. 5: pp. 14, 15]

The words "modernization" or "development" refer to the overall processes of social, economic, intellectual, political, and cultural change that are associated with the direction of nations from a relatively poor, rural, agrarian society to a wealthier, urban, industrialized society [Ref. 6,7,8]. In order for a society to achieve the goals of development in either a capitalist or socialist framework, regime stability is one of many conditions that must be present [Ref. 5: p. 15].

U.S. and Soviet interests in the maintenance of regime stability in the third world also include the desire for both nations to gain some degree of political and economic influence on the recipient nation and the region surrounding them. Both U.S. and Soviet arms transfers to third world regimes have become part of a system of control both

directly (in the form of military bases agreements) and indirectly (in the form of collective security agreements) [Ref. 9; Ref. 10: pp. 6-9].

In many third world nations political power is in the hands of those with the most firepower. The survival of many regimes depends on its possession of arms and the maintenance of a loyal military force. U.S. and Soviet arms transfers to many third world nations serve to supply the ruling regime with the most firepower. This supply of arms ensures the regime's ruling power over any opposition both external and internal [Ref. 1]. By maintaining the power of many of these regimes, it is possible that both U.S. and Soviet long term national interests can be realized [Ref. 11: pp. 5-9].

In many third world nations the arms are used by a military faction within the regime to ensure political and social order. This type of situation reveals the influence of "praetorianism." "Praetorianism" as stated in "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" [Ref. 12] refers to a political situation in which military officers are major or predominant actors by virtue of actual or threatened use of force [Ref 13: p. 3]. This situation is found in both democratic or socialist nations. Chairman Mao stated that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun " and that the ultimate power of the state, as of those who might hope to

overthrow it, lies with the men who possess the rifles, machine guns, tanks, and planes [Ref. 13: p. 5].

Regime stability is important to the U.S. and the Soviet Union because it can facilitate the achievement of development in either a capitalist or socialist system. Regime stability provides for a check on the internal and external threats to a government that would prevent development or cause overthrow and possible anarchy. By maintaining certain regimes in power through arms transfers the supplier nation may achieve its long term national interests both in the recipient nation and the surrounding region.

B. HYPOTHESES

Research was based on the following hypotheses:

- 1) If U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers increase to a recipient third world nation, then the recipient nation is likely to see an increase in its regime stability.
- 2) The greater the amount of U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers, the greater the decline in external and internal threats to the recipient third world regime.

In view of the recent U.S. and U.S.S.R. involvements in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively, these hypotheses may seem intuitively obvious. Arms transfer literature implies in some cases that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union

proceed on a course based on the proposition that increasing the amount of arms transfers increases the regime stability. The purpose of this paper is to examine this belief using empirical evidence from six cases. [Ref. 14: p. 11]

C. THE FOCUSED COMPARISON APPROACH

This study is not intended to be a statistical analysis of U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers to the third world. The focused comparison approach [Ref. 15: p. 10] will be used. This method examines a set number of cases and asks a set of standardized and general questions of each case. The questions asked will represent either independent or dependent variables.

The focused comparison approach will examine three U.S. cases and three Soviet cases. The unit of analysis in each case will be a supplier-recipient pair for specific time periods. These time periods are representative of the years of major U.S. and Soviet involvement with the recipient nation. The U.S. cases will be: Vietnam (1960-1975), the Philippines (1950-1989), and El Salvador (1960-1989). The U.S.S.R. cases will be: Afghanistan (1960-1989), Vietnam (1976-1989), and Nicaragua (1979-1989).

The U.S. cases and the Soviet cases were selected due to the intuitive similarities found in the supplier nation's involvement with the recipient third world nation. Each U.S. case will have a corresponding Soviet case. The U.S. cases

will be examined separately from the Soviet cases. The following shows the intuitive similarities between the U.S. and Soviet cases:

- 1) U.S.-Vietnam (1960-1975)/U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan (1960-1989). Both nations were supplied with arms from their earliest days of independence. The supplier nation sent large numbers of combat troops into the recipient nation. Both suppliers withdrew combat forces but continued to supply arms to support the regime.
- 2) U.S.-Philippines (1950-1989)/U.S.S.R.-Vietnam (1976-1989). Both suppliers maintain bases and troops in the recipient nation. Arms transfers are used to maintain regime stability while ensuring access to bases. Possession of military bases also ensures a continued influence in the recipient nation and the surrounding region.
- 3) U.S.-El Salvador (1960-1989)/U.S.S.R.-Nicaragua (1979-1989). Both of the suppliers to the two Central American nations do so to foster their ideological compatibility. Neither supplier has bases or maintains combat troops in the recipient nation.

Each case will be presented by a graph showing the total U.S. dollar value of arms transferred in each year of the

case's time period. The total U.S. dollar amounts of arms transferred by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union will be the measurement of value for each case. It is expected that the graphs will show peaks and valleys in the amounts of arms transferred.

The level of each case's internal and external threats, as perceived primarily by the supplier, will be examined over each case's time period. The determination of the level of internal and external threat will focus on the years showing peaks in the amount of arms transferred. From the overall levels of internal and external threat, the resulting overall level of regime stability will be determined for each case. The dependent variables are: internal threat, external threat, and regime stability. The independent variable is: total U.S. dollar value of arms transferred. The specific variables and level determination will be explained later in greater detail.

D. DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variables will be categorized as either high or low. The perceptions will be based primarily from the view of the supplier. The following shows how the level of the dependent variables is determined in each case:

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Level</u>
Internal Threat	High: Increasing number of insurgents. Increasing number of political

assassinations.

Increasing number of coup attempts
or successes.

Increasing number of political and
military factionalism.

Majority of military forces fight
insurgents and repress political
opposition.

Low: Few or decreasing number of
organized insurgents.

Decreasing number of or few
active political opposition
forces.

Few political assassinations.

Loyal military forces.

Military not involved in major
anti-insurgent or political
repression operations.

External Threat

High: Attacks by foreign military
forces.

High potential of foreign
military invasion.

Low: No hostilities with foreign
nations.

Few attacks or incidents with

foreign military forces.

Regime Stability

High: Transition of government power by constitutional means or by the use of established orderly political mechanisms.

Government forces are able to maintain political, economic, and social order.

Government leadership maintains established treaties with the supplier nation.

The leadership and the regime is in little danger of falling.

Low: The government is on the verge of being overthrown by internal or external forces.

The government or the military is unable to maintain political, economic, and social order.

No individual or organization is firmly in charge.

By determining in each case the level of internal threat, external threat, and the resulting regime stability, the method of focused comparison assures that data from the various cases are comparable [Ref. 14: p. 16].

E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable is the total U.S. dollar value of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers to the recipient third world nation. There is a wide variety of data available on the quantity of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers. Some records cover a span from 1950 to 1989. The most comprehensive data is given in 1987 U.S. dollar values [Ref. 16]. The U.S. dollar amounts for a specific year vary somewhat from source to source due to current dollar value conversions, liberal rounding to even dollar amounts, and the arms programs included to derive the total dollar amount. The same inconsistencies are found with the value totals for Soviet arms transfers.

The total arms transfer amount for the U.S. cases will be determined by adding the following values for each year in the case's time period: Foreign Military Sales Agreements, Commercial Sales, Military Assistance Programs, Military Assistance Service Funds (Military Departments), Excess Defense Articles Program, and International Military Education and Training Program [Ref. 16: p. iv]. The total Soviet arms transfer amounts are usually given as one value per year and are not broken down into specific components [Ref. 17]. For the purposes of this paper it is more important to emphasize the general quantitative patterns in the amount of arms transferred. Establishing the trend of

arms transfer values within the case's time period is the major objective of the independent variable.

F. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

The hypotheses will be tested by using a matrix. There will be a matrix presented after the U.S. cases and the Soviet cases are analyzed. The levels of internal threat, external threat, and the resulting level of regime stability will be determined by matching historical events within the recipient nation to the trend in the amounts of arms transferred. The columns of the matrix will contain (from left to right): case and period, internal threat, external threat, regime stability, and trend of amount of arms transferred. The hypotheses will be true if the increases in the amounts of arms transferred correspond to an increase in regime stability. The following is a sample matrix:

<u>CASE & PERIOD</u>	<u>INTERNAL THREAT</u>	<u>EXTERNAL THREAT</u>	<u>REGIME STABILITY</u>	<u>TREND OF TRANSFERS</u>
U.S./VIET. 1960-1975	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	INCREASING
U.S./PHIL. 1950-1989	HIGH	LOW	LOW	INCREASING

The matrix will also show the levels of internal threat and external threat and its relationship to the trend in arms transfers for the case's time period.

II. U.S. CASES

The U.S. cases are: Vietnam (1960-1975), the Philippines (1950-1989), and El Salvador (1960-1989). These cases were chosen because of the similar foundations and relationship characteristics between the supplier and the recipient third world nation. These cases were also chosen because they appear to represent the broad scope and extent of arms transfers to the third world, allowing greater generalization. The extent of U.S. arms transfers spans much of the history of the recipient nation since their gaining of independence and subsequent regime formations.

A. VIETNAM (1960-1975)

From World War II to 1975, in an unprecedented effort to shape and control a country's political character, the power of the United States was for over thirty years projected into Vietnam [Ref. 1: p. x-xi]. The first and foremost reason for U.S. involvement in Vietnam was the U.S. desire to prevent the government of South Vietnam from becoming a Communist state [Ref. 1: p. x; Ref. 2: p. 4].

The building of a separate anti-communist state in South Vietnam demanded a continuing U.S. effort focused on shaping the Saigon government into an instrument supportive of both U.S. strategic and geopolitical objectives [Ref. 1: p. x;

Ref. 2: p. 5]. In order to establish a non-communist government in southern Vietnam it was necessary to support any Saigon regime against internal threats and direct aggression from Communist North Vietnamese armed forces [Ref. 2: p. 7]. Since the formation of South Vietnam under the frail leadership of Bao Dai in July 1954, the U.S. recognized that democratic, economic, and social development could only be achieved with massive U.S. military aid to the Saigon regime [Ref. 2: p. 6; Ref. 3: p. 13].

1. ARMS TRANSFERS

U.S. commitment to the government of South Vietnam started with the Eisenhower administration. In 1955, U.S., French and Vietnamese officials agreed in Saigon that the U.S. would assume full responsibilities for training and arming the armed forces of South Vietnam. In 1960, under the Kennedy administration, arms transfers to South Vietnam increased steadily as the Saigon government under Ngo Dinh Diem, who deposed Bao Dai, began organizing the legitimate armed forces of South Vietnam. [Ref. 3: p. QQ]

The first large scale arms transfers occurred in 1963. In November of 1963 the Diem regime was overthrown in a military coup. Diem was killed. After a series of successive coups, General Nguyen Van Thieu became chief of state with General Nguyen Cao Ky as premier in 1965. [Ref. 3: p. 181; Ref. 4,5]

The first year of direct large scale U.S. combat involvement in Vietnam against Viet Cong insurgents and North Vietnamese forces occurred in 1965. U.S. arms transfers continued to soar during the years of direct U.S. military forces involvement from 1965 to 1973. With the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces in 1973, there was a dramatic decline in arms transfers to the Saigon government. [Ref. 3: p. 220]. The end was near. Table 1 shows the amounts of U.S. arms transfers by year.

Table 1*

U.S.-VIETNAM ARMS TRANSFERS

(In 1987 U.S.\$1000)

YEAR	FMS	C/S	MAP	MASF	EDAP	IMET	TOTAL
1960	5	-	86326	-	4495	4837	95699
1961	-	-	87037	-	11713	6975	105725
1962	-	-	160680	-	21477	11318	193475
1963	-	-	176792	-	24812	17591	219195
1964	-	-	169061	-	10951	15756	414963
1965	-	-	223259	-	84535	14603	322897
1966	-	-	89510	551275	40824	8870	690479
1967	-	-	-	647440	15113	-	662553
1968	-	-	-	964887	278460	-	1243347
1969	2	-	-	1250762	283218	-	1533980
1970	-	-	-	1469019	99296	-	1568315
1971	-	-	-	1863827	37590	-	1901417
1972	2	-	-	2292034	47891	-	2339925
1973	1155	-	-	3246675	79800	-	3326475
1974	4	-	-	772622	14342	-	786946
1975	-	-	-	543698	30	-	543728

*Compiled from Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.


The case evidence is examined to see if increases in arms transfers follows U.S. perceptions in the regime's ability to resist threats imposed by internal dissent,

insurgency, and aggression from North Vietnam [Ref. 2: p. 428]. Figure 1 is a graph that represents the total amounts of U.S. arms transferred from 1960 to 1975.

Figure 1*

1960-1975 Total Arms Transfers

(In 1987 U.S.\$ millions)



*Compiled from Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.

2. Internal Threat

After overthrowing the Bao Dai government in 1954, the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem consolidated its power by suppressing political opposition. Confronted with the inability to achieve any progress on the South Vietnamese people's demands for economic and political reform, internal opposition mounted. In 1960 former Diem cabinet ministers formed the first legal opposition party and rallied the populace behind charges that the Diem regime was adopting "dictatorial Communist-like methods" to ensure "one party rule." [Ref. 6]

In 1960, the Vietminh rebels and other mostly

Communist oriented rebel groups formed a formal pro-Communist organization, the National Liberation Front. This organization later came to be known as the Viet Cong (VC). Viet Cong strength grew rapidly in the southern countryside. The U.S. government did not believe the insurgent strength reported by the Diem regime but instead relied heavily on the estimates made by the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) stationed in South Vietnam [Ref. 8]. It was impossible to get an accurate count of VC strength in South Vietnam, but both the U.S. and the Saigon government agreed on the fact that the VC threat was growing in numbers and firepower [Ref. 9: p. 5].

The Johnson administration in July of 1965 decided to proceed with a major escalatory step to compliment increased arms supplies. President Johnson and his advisors made the decision to commit large numbers of U.S. ground forces. The decision was partly based on the belief that the South Vietnamese armed forces were unable to check the internal threat on their own regardless of the amount of arms transfers. The period of 1966-1973 represented the total "Americanization" of the war which involved ever increasing numbers of men, until the president called a halt at more than half a million American troops. [Ref. 1: p. 366; Ref. 2: p. 218-221].

Throughout the period of 1960-1975 the internal

threat as posed mainly by the VC grew in organization, numbers, foreign support, and determination to achieve final victory. Despite the enormous U.S. investment up to that point, the last Saigon government made many of the same pleas for help as it did in 1960. The regime in the hands of Vice President Huong still had no real control over the people or countryside [Ref. 10: p. 10-12].

3. External Threat

Since the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the government of the north under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh sought to reunite the country under Communist rule. The U.S. from the Eisenhower to the Nixon administration perceived the threat from North Vietnam to be one of total commitment to seize control of the South. The commitment was no less intense than North Korea's attempt to conquer the South in 1950. [Ref. 9: p. 1]

The evidence given from all of Saigon's regimes and the U.S. military advisors in country from the 1959 to 1965 showed that the hard core of the Communists forces attacking South Vietnam were trained, armed, and ordered into the South by the Hanoi government. The evidence also showed that the types of weapons and ammunition delivered to the Communists forces fighting in the South must have come from suppliers outside of North Vietnam. The primary suppliers were the People's Republic of China and other Communist

states and only channeled their weapons through North Vietnam. All of these facts gave credibility to the so-called "domino theory." The U.S. believed that if South Vietnam were to fall to North Vietnam, other neighboring Southeast Asian countries would fall under Communist control. [Ref. 2: p. 95; Ref. 3: p. 70; Ref. 9: p. 1-2]

It was perceived by the U.S. that the government in Saigon could not survive the gains made by VC and North Vietnamese forces [Ref. 3: p. 47]. The period 1966 to 1973 saw massive increases in the amounts of arms transfers to the Saigon government. From the 1967 to 1969 the Saigon government was able to maintain control only in some of the areas surrounding the central regions of the country near Saigon but continued to grossly miscalculate VC and North Vietnamese resilience and strength [Ref. 2: p. 135]. Even at the peak year of U.S. arms transfers to the Saigon government and massive U.S. bombing in the north, the North Vietnamese armed forces continued to strengthen its infiltration and military successes in the south [Ref. 11].

4. Regime Stability

Beginning with the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the south was unable to form an effective and cohesive government. This was in extreme contrast to the government in Hanoi. In 1960 the Saigon government was under the control of the Diem regime. At first Diem was liked by the

south's nationalists, but Diem soon resorted to extreme repression of all opposition to ensure his hold on power [Ref. 6]. Diem's government was overtly corrupt and was unable to gain any economic or social developments. The government faced widespread political opposition, particularly from the Buddhist faction [Ref. 1: p. 189]. The war against the VC and North Vietnamese forces was escalating.

After several previous coup attempts, the Diem regime was overthrown in November 1963. Diem was assassinated by members of the military loyal to the new leader, General Duong Van Minh. General Minh did not support the manner in which the U.S. was conducting the war. He opposed bombing of the north and increases in U.S. military advisers in the south. Minh maintained that any increased American presence would have serious adverse political consequences for the people of South Vietnam. Backed by the U.S., General Khanh deposed Minh in January 1964. Among the top members of the Saigon officer corps, the U.S. regarded Khanh as the general most "cooperative of U.S. policy." [Ref: 1: p. 188, 189]

After General Khanh a series of negotiations resulted in the transfer of government to Premier Phan Quat early in 1965. In June of that year Premier Quat handed over responsibility and power to the armed forces. A

military triumvirate headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu assumed control of government. General Thieu became chief of state and General Nguyen Cao Ky became premier. [Ref. 12: p. 209].

As U.S. arms transfers and direct military involvement increased steadily from 1960 to 1966, the political situation became more and more confused. As each successive regime assumed power, each promised more economic development and an end to the war. In 1966, South Vietnam was plagued with growing civil uprisings by Buddhists, mass protests, general strikes, anti-Ky and anti-U.S. demonstrations. [Ref. 13, 14]

In September 1967, Thieu and Ky were elected president and vice-president respectively. Their regime showed little progress toward ending the insurgency and the expanding war with North Vietnam. Political, economic, and military problems mounted throughout the 1967-1975 period. The Thieu regime was unable to prevent gains by the Communist forces. He maintained power by his firm control of the military. Yet, the confusion that was found in Saigon in 1963 to 1965 continued throughout the years of the Thieu regime. The regime was corrupt and ineffective in all aspects of government. The major problem in Saigon, that no amount of arms transfers could save, was that no one in Saigon was ever legitimately in charge. U.S. policy

toward South Vietnam was fundamentally flawed. It counted on "helping the government in Saigon when no government in fact existed." [Ref 1: p. 419,432; Ref. 10: p. 10; Ref. 15]

5. Case Assessment

The period from 1960 to 1967 saw a gradual increase in the amounts of arms transfers. A sharp increase occurred in 1968 and rose rapidly to the 1973 peak. The dramatic drop in arms transfers corresponded to the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Vietnam. The period that showed the rapid increase corresponded to the "Americanization" of the war. Arms transfers showed an overall increasing trend.

Throughout the entire period from 1960 to 1975 the government of South Vietnam was confronted with the same growing internal threats. The Communist VC insurgency continued to grow in numbers, organization, strength, firepower, and resolve to defeat any Saigon government. All regimes were repressive to any political opposition. The period saw continued general strikes, anti-government, and anti-U.S. demonstrations. There was a definite existence of a "praetorian" state. Those who maintained the loyalties of the military maintained control of government. All regimes were unable to achieve economic, political, or social development. The overall internal threat from 1960 to 1975 is categorized as high.

The external threat to South Vietnam had grown ever

since the country was partitioned in 1954. The Communist forces of North Vietnam maintained continued growth in manpower, firepower, and infiltration into the south. The Hanoi government received the backing of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist Block nations. The Hanoi government was resolute in defeating the south. Hanoi achieved the final victory after an enormous struggle in April 1975. The overall external threat throughout the time period is categorized as high.

The 1960-1975 period saw more than eight separate regimes fall. There were numerous coup attempts throughout the period. Each regime was characterized by corruption and ineffectiveness in seeing an end to the war or achieving any kind of national development. The regime maintained power by ensuring the loyalties of the military leadership and by keeping in step with all U.S. policies toward the Vietnam conflict. All regimes in fact had no real control over the country or its people.

The governments of Saigon have been described as being nothing more than suits of armor like those found standing in museums [Ref. 11]. U.S. arms transfers represent the suits of armor and appear strong and formidable. But all the armor suits are hollow. They all must be propped-up and are delicately pieced together. One kick is all it takes for the hollow suit to come crashing

down. The U.S. involvement focused on maintaining a government that did not actually have control over a nation. The overall regime stability is categorized as low.

B. PHILIPPINES (1960-1989)

Since the destruction of the Spanish fleet by the United States naval forces at Manila Bay and the subsequent victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States has been firmly entrenched in the Philippines. From these roots the U.S.-Philippine alliance has evolved into a "special relationship." It has been a strong and enduring relationship. The heart of the alliance has been the Philippine dependence upon the United States. In particular, the Philippines has relied almost entirely upon the United States for arms supplies since its gaining of independence in 1946. This fact seems to underscore the strong ties between the broad regional U.S. interests and the maintenance of Philippine government security.[Ref.16]

Vital to the U.S.-Philippine relationship is the transfer of arms and the significant U.S. military presence on the islands. The American military presence has had political, social, and economic impact. It is this presence that realizes the U.S. commitment to forward defense. U.S. presence thus far has been compatible to both U.S. and Philippine interest. U.S. support to the Manila regimes has centered on the belief on both sides that continued military

presence and continued arms transfers to the Philippine government contributes to political stability and national security. [Ref. 17]

1. Arms Transfers

The U.S. military presence in the Philippines was based on the provisions of the 1946 Treaty of General Relations Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. This document granted independence to the Philippines and also reserved access to military bases in the Philippines. In 1951 the Military Assistance Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty were signed. The preamble to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement stated that in the interest of mutual defense, the U.S. would be allowed to use the designated bases "free of rent." From the very beginnings of this agreement the U.S. has "voluntarily" offered the Philippine government compensation in the form of military and economic aid. [Ref. 18]

The largest amounts of arms transfers during the 1950's were delivered from 1950 to 1955. This corresponded to the formation of the Philippine armed forces. The period of the 1960's to the early 1970's saw gradual transfers until the peak of 1977. The late 1970's and the early 1980's showed moderate levels until the dramatic rise in 1988. Table 2 shows the amounts transferred during the period of 1950 to 1989.

Table 2*

1950-1989 ARMS TRANSFER


(columns in 1987 U.S.\$1000 and Totals in 1989 dollars)

YEAR	FMS	C/S	MAP	EDAP	IMET	TOTALS
1950	162	-	13817	4250	583	19378
1951	183	-	22162	199	438	23671
1952	474	-	47348	2529	552	52430
1953	481	-	13090	2657	1010	17755
1954	315	-	3350	764	450	5025
1955	185	-	9561	2247	639	13011
1956	15	-	29625	3987	857	35521
1957	711	-	7069	1513	2489	12135
1958	576	-	8445	22679	2398	35121
1959	409	-	22402	4621	1729	3036
1960	48	-	33250	4102	755	39249
1961	212	-	31933	2992	1968	38218
1962	236	-	8030	1988	2510	13147
1963	206	-	14902	494	2689	18840
1964	36	-	18947	1586	2297	23552
1965	260	-	20565	766	1359	23693
1966	137	-	21045	718	1146	23737
1967	439	-	25188	3674	909	31116
1968	237	-	19620	1625	1327	23493
1969	454	-	15991	1885	1051	19962
1970	825	-	14633	3638	786	20550
1971	1107	596	14634	2255	985	20164
1972	468	290	12977	2085	988	17312
1973	1159	187	15903	15654	815	34730
1974	3863	1966	14822	2336	574	24268
1975	28155	2942	18628	1374	405	53050
1976	33713	11768	18451	5026	848	71900
1977	63972	14082	15674	726	594	97899
1978	27464	7184	17230	37	713	54207
1979	17935	5589	15925	38	646	41337
1980	10617	7954	25186	1	529	45617
1981	6026	967	24964	-	398	33326
1982	15460	1000	746	-	1129	18885
1983	18117	5859	621	-	1296	26670
1984	11636	4018	741	-	1462	18393
1985	38423	11566	-	-	2205	53760
1986	56640	2224	10000	-	2371	73372
1987	107726	4856	-	-	2550	118592
1988	133124	7328	-	-	2626	147370
1989	-	-	-	-	-	126613

*Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1988.,
COMUSNAVPIL, Press Briefs, July 1988, September 1989.

The amount of arms transfers are somewhat consistent but show dramatic rises in certain years. The case needs to be examined to see if these rises follows U.S. perceptions of the threats to the Manila regimes. Figure 2 is a graph showing the totals transferred in the period.

Figure 2*



*Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987.

2. Internal Threat

The period between 1950 to 1959 marked the beginnings of the Philippine recovery from World War II. The island nation gained its independence in 1946 and quickly moved to establish its democratic foundations. Almost immediately the newly formed democracy found a growing opposition from peasant guerrillas. These guerrillas, largely influenced and backed by the growing

Communist movement in the Far East, organized into a potent military force threatening the elected regimes of the fifties. These groups of guerrillas were known as the Huks.

Another group of insurgents gained influence as an organized front in the 1950's. This group had fought for autonomy since the Spaniards imposed their rule in the 1600's. They were the two rival Moslem groups - the mainstream Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The newly organized Philippine armed forces were quickly confronted with a significant number of well organized and armed opposition force of Huk guerrillas in the northern islands and Muslim guerrillas in the southern island of Mindanao. The largest delivery of U.S. arms during the 1950's came in 1952. This corresponded to the U.S. pledge to back the Manila regime with arms to combat anti-government forces on Luzon and Mindanao [Ref. 19].

During the 1950's major confrontations occurred between Muslim guerrillas and Philippine army forces. 5000 Muslim guerrillas attacked battalion sized Philippine army units throughout the southern islands. In the northern islands the Huk guerrillas started urban terrorist operations that were successful in assassinating key political figures. [Ref. 20]

The Huk insurgency transformed into a new

organization in the early 1960's. The Communist movement took a new armed stance in the formation of the New People's Army (NPA). Like the Huks this force used guerrilla tactics against government troops in the countryside and terrorist tactics in the urban areas. By the mid-1970's the Communist insurgency grew especially in the northern provinces. Though no accurate numbers exist the estimated strength of the NPA reached 40,000 members [Ref. 21].

The MNLF forces in Mindanao also intensified and grew in numbers. Moslem rebels in Mindanao were covertly being supported by Islamic nations, in particular, Libya. In 1977 negotiations were conducted between the Philippine government under President Marcos and the MNLF in Tripoli, Libya. After a few months the talks were discontinued because of the persistent demands by the MNLF for the independence of Mindanao and other Islamic regions of the Philippines. [Ref. 22]

In 1972, President Marcos declared a state of martial law. This was in response to the intensifying insurgency, the widespread corruption and lawlessness throughout the country, and the growing political opposition to his regime [Ref. 23]. By the late 1970's the Marcos regime was faced with severe inflation and other economic difficulties. The Marcos government negotiated a new Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in December of 1976. The U.S.

agreed to give the Marcos regime over a billion dollars in military and economic assistance. Much of this assistance was given in order to finance the largest military build-up in Philippine history for the purpose of combating the insurgency and to strengthen the regime's hold on power [Ref. 24].

The period of the 1980's saw much internal turmoil. The Communist and Muslim insurgencies were still gaining strength and support in the countryside. The political opposition to the Marcos regime was increasingly becoming more intensified. Pressures were placed upon the Marcos regime to reinstate constitutional rights and free elections. The force that finally brought the Marcos regime down was the combined political forces under the leadership of Mrs. Corazon Aquino, the wife of the slain long-time opposition leader, Benigno Aquino [Ref. 25].

The Aquino regime quickly inherited all of the problems faced by the ousted regime, namely the growing NPA and MNLF insurgencies, an extremely poor economy, political opposition by Marcos loyalists, several coup attempts, and a continually suspect military element [Ref. 26,27,28]. The Aquino regime negotiated a new MBA in 1987. Aquino claimed that one of the reasons for the higher price of U.S. compensation was the growing expense needed to counter the insurgent forces. President Aquino complained that the U.S.

"expected the Philippine forces to fight with only teeth and hands." [Ref. 28]

3. External Threat

The period 1950 to 1989 saw little direct external threat to the Philippines as perceived by both the U.S. and the Philippines. The 1950's experienced the U.S. intervention in Korea. The People's Republic of China was in Korea and Communist forces defeated the French in Vietnam. The Mutual Defense Agreement of 1951 guaranteed Philippine security in case of attack from another country, in particular the People's Republic of China. Subsequent agreements, the Manila Pact of 1954 and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), later served to solidify the U.S. assurances of a "umbrella of protection" for the region [Ref. 1: p.71].

During the 1960's the U.S. significantly increased its involvement in Southeast Asia. With the growing U.S. actions in Vietnam, the Philippine bases became important logistics assets. President Eisenhower in 1960 explicitly restated U.S. assurances that an armed attack on the Philippines would involve an armed attack on the U.S. forces stationed there and would instantly be repelled. Eisenhower pledged the intensification of military cooperation with respect to SEATO and continued military assistance programs to further Philippine defense capability in "light of modern

requirements and the threat to the Far East posed by China."

[Ref. 29]

One of the only direct external threats, though very small in scale, during the 1980's has been Chinese and Vietnamese forces on the Spratley Islands. The Philippine government explored the areas surrounding the Spratley Islands and exchanged gunfire [Ref. 24, 30].

4. Regime Stability

During the period of the 1950' the U.S. helped to secure the position of secretary of defense for their own candidate, Ramon Magsaysay. The U.S. consequently helped to ensure his election as president. While he held these positions the U.S. cooperated effectively with him to suppress the Communist Huk insurgency. [Ref. 1: p. 70]

The 1960's also saw a period of relative political stability. Elections were conducted regularly and the transition of government occurred by constitutional means. The advent of the Marcos regime saw the emergence of relative instability in Philippine government.

The Marcos regime imposed martial law in 1972. The period was marked by widespread demonstrations, strikes, armed insurgency, and growing political opposition. The Marcos regime suppressed constitutional freedoms and political dissension. Marcos developed a loyal cadre of military officers and ensured the loyalty of the armed

forces. The 1977 delivery of U.S. military aid in effect helped to build a strong and loyal military arm for the Marcos regime.

The early 1980's saw an appeal for political reform by the U.S. in view of the growing internal turmoil in the Philippines. In 1985 and 1986 the U.S. Congress became involved in the crisis in the Philippines to an extent unmatched in most other countries during the period. The election of 1986 brought the opposition leader, Mrs. Aquino to power. The new Aquino regime immediately faced much of the same internal turmoil of the Marcos regime. Her regime from the very beginning was considered extremely fragile. [Ref. 24: 173-174]

5. Case Assessment

The period of the 1950's saw the emergence of the armed Communist-backed insurgency and the Moslem independence movements. Through the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's the insurgencies have continued to grow in strength and numbers. Both have continued their large-scale attacks on government forces and their widespread urban terrorists attacks. These attacks have centered on key political figures and have included numerous American military personnel. The internal threat is categorized as high.

The external threat historically has been the People's Republic of China as perceived by the U.S. Since

the involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam and the continued U.S. troop presence in the Philippines, there is no direct external threat to the Philippines. The external threat is categorized as low.

The political opposition intensified under the Marcos regime. The subsequent Aquino regime has been unable to achieve any significant political, economic, or social development and a strong opposition exists. The regime is faced with growing inflation, civil strife, a disloyal military, coup attempts, and corruption in government. Communist insurgents continue to carry out terrorist acts against government officials and American military personnel.

The Aquino government is currently negotiating (1990) another MBA. There is a growing anti-American sentiment in the Philippines, not only among elements in the government but among the Philippine people as well. The solution to the country's economic, political, and social problems can not be found in continued increases in U.S. military and economic aid. The overall regime stability is categorized as low.

C. EL SALVADOR (1960-1989)

The United States has long been interested in its neighbors to the south. During the course of the twentieth century the U.S. has landed troops in many of the major

Central American nations. With the advent of the Panama Canal the U.S. has maintained a vital interest in keeping stability in the region. The U.S. has been an influential force in the internal politics of many nations in Latin America. [Ref. 32: p. 4]

El Salvador has been such a nation. Throughout this century the U.S. has been an influential force in the internal politics and direction of El Salvador. Most recently, U.S.-El Salvador relations have focused on the U.S. involvement in that nation's long running civil war. Much of the U.S. policies toward El Salvador have centered on the U.S. perception of Cuban and Soviet activities in the region. The U.S. has made its commitment to support the government of El Salvador and to prevent it from falling to the tide of Communist backed insurgencies. In El Salvador, the U.S. made a commitment to foster democracy, but often settled simply to achieve political order. [Ref. 32: p. 19; Ref. 33: p. 51]

1. Arms Transfers

In the early 1960's the Kennedy administration had given U.S. support to the government of EL Salvador in light of the Cuban crisis and the desire for the U.S. to maintain hegemony in the hemisphere [Ref. 34: p. 68] It was also the goal of the U.S. to foster development in Latin America. The U.S. maintained the belief that through development much

of the environment that spawned Communist movements would be eliminated [Ref. 35: p. 61-74].

Arms transfers were relatively moderate during the 1960's though no democratic institutions were in place in El Salvador. Most all of the nation's regimes had been led by army officers. The economic elite ruled the country in close conjunction with the military. Since 1931, nearly every president had been an army officer. Periodic elections were not legitimate. [Ref. 36]

Since the early 1960's the U.S. decided it was of paramount importance to curb the tide of Communist insurgencies regardless of the regime's style of rule. The Communists were a force that "did not play fair." U.S. military assistance must be used in order to maintain internal political order [Ref. 37: p. 151]. The primary purpose of U.S. arms transfers was for the maintenance of internal security and to check Communist influences so that the government could focus its efforts on development [Ref. 38: p. 166].

The 1960's and the 1970's saw relatively few increases in arms transfers. The gradual rise in arms transfers started in 1979. This corresponded to the Reagan administration's policies on Central America. Table 3 shows the amounts of arms transfers in each year of the case's period.

Table 3*

1960-1987 ARMS TRANSFERS

(In 1987 U.S.\$1000)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>C/S</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>EDAP</u>	<u>IMET</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1960	7	-	-	3	83	86
1961	67	-	-	-	217	284
1962	-	-	529	2	504	1034
1963	-	-	4119	307	58	1484
1964	3	-	619	226	320	1168
1965	18	-	303	68	226	615
1966	35	-	459	131	277	902
1967	15	-	169	9	159	352
1968	514	-	94	55	281	944
1969	6	-	206	8	175	395
1970	-	-	352	35	224	611
1971	2	-	47	96	286	431
1972	-	-	200	11	255	466
1973	52	-	15	-	492	559
1974	381	-	122	203	437	1143
1975	393	-	560	1268	493	2714
1976	726	-	222	1476	794	3218
1977	146	-	9	34	565	754
1978	9	-	3	-	-	12
1979	-	-	4	-	-	4
1980	2291	-	165	-	244	2700
1981	9842	-	24413	-	1157	35412
1982	15968	-	45228	28	5250	66474
1983	665154	-	33500	-	4984	103638
1984	121146	-	176750	-	3590	301486
1985	138923	-	124750	-	1474	265147
1986	115017	-	120367	-	1440	236824
1987	104926	-	110000	-	1455	216381


*Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987.

The rise in arms transfers during the 1980's is also influenced by the increase in U.S. involvement in what has become El Salvador's civil war. Figure 3 is a graph that shows the total amount transferred in over the course of the case's time period.

Figure 3*

1960-1987 Total Arms Transfers

(In 1987 U.S.\$1000)



*Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987.

2. Internal Threat

The year 1961 started with a successful coup. A group of army officers overthrew the government of President Jose Lemus and quickly moved to form a military-civilian junta. The coup was carried out in order to halt the "leftist excesses" that were continuing to grow in El Salvador. [Ref. 39]

The Kennedy administration backed the regimes of the early 1960's because each regime announced that it intended to establish free elections and solve the nation's economic

and social problems. Kennedy announced that these regimes were in "consonance with U.S. goals for a free and prosperous Latin America." These governments continued to strengthen their repressive apparatus of military, paramilitary, and police forces. [Ref. 40, 41]

During the 1960's popular organizations of workers, peasants, and students began forming. These organizations, opposed to the repressive military rule, became increasingly radicalized. After the Salvadorean armed forces (SAF) prevented an elected government from taking control of power in 1972, the Salvadorean people intensified their beliefs that there was little hope for change through the electoral process. The popular organizations expanded as students, farmers, peasants, and church workers joined together to lead strikes and demonstrations demanding reform and an end to the repression. In the late 1970's, the regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero increased repression. There was a sharp increase in government supported right-wing death squads. [Ref. 41: p. 19-22; Ref. 42: p. 2]

The 1980's saw the formation of organized guerrilla forces dedicated to the downfall of El Salvador's military regimes. In 1980 several organizations and two left-of-center political parties (Social Democrats and Popular Social Christian Movement) formed the Democratic

Revolutionary Front (FDR). The armed faction of the resistance movement, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was created to join the four major guerrilla armies in El Salvador. The FMLN was being supplied with arms from Communist nations through Nicaragua. [Ref: 36; Ref. 41: p. 20; Ref. 42: p. 2; Ref. 43]

The most potent internal threat to the government of El Salvador continues to be the growing insurgency of the FMLN. The main focus of U.S. aid to El Salvador has been to strengthen the SAF. The U.S. proceeds on the belief that by strengthening the SAF, a military shield can form, and the government will be allowed to make progress toward economic and political development. [Ref. 44]

3. External Threat

Throughout the period of 1960 to 1989 there has been little direct external threat to El Salvador. The brief war with Honduras over border disputes was officially ended by the signing of a peace treaty in 1980. The treaty formed a basis for resolving any future disputes by an International Court of Justice adjudication. [Ref. 36]

There has been a more significant indirect external threat to the governments of El Salvador. Since the fall of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in October of 1979 several guerrilla armies have used Nicaragua for small bases of operations, havens, and as a source of arms supplies. Much

of U.S. support to El Salvador has come from the U.S. perception that the overthrow of the government of El Salvador is the goal of Nicaragua. [Ref. 45: p. 1316]

4. Regime Stability

The Kennedy administration gave support to the governments of El Salvador to prevent the spread of Communist influence in the hemisphere. Praetorianism has been an influential force in El Salvador. The transition of government power since the 1960's have for the most part been decided by the military.

The major coups occurred in 1961, 1962, 1972, and 1979. In each case the military-civilian juntas made promises to form legitimately elected governments. In each case there has been an increase in the amount of civilian repression. The 1984 election of Duarte saw no improvements. Citizen resistance movements grew along with the strength of the Communist supported FMLN and other rebel armies. Each regime has at some time declared a state of national emergency or declared a state of siege to exist.

The period of the 1980's has seen little improvement in the prospects for long term regime stability. The regime of President Alfredo Cristiani has declared that new measures were needed to combat terrorism. Death tolls have continued to rise as both right and left-wing violence intensifies. Though U.S. military aid has increased

throughout the 1980's, aid has been conditional. The government of El Salvador has had to show improvements in human rights, prosecution of military-backed assassins, and on implementing legitimate elections.[Ref. 42: p. 51; Ref. 46; Ref. 47]

5. Case Assessment

The internal threat to the government of El Salvador has seen an increase in intensity, growth in numbers, and a rise in casualties on both sides. The FMLN has maintained armed opposition against government forces. The overall internal threat is categorized as high.

The external threat has been indirect. External threat has been in the form of support of insurgent operations. There appears to be little chance of a direct invasion from a neighboring force. The overall external threat is categorized as low.

The praetorian state in El Salvador has resulted in the success of coups and the resulting military-civilian juntas. The people have little faith in the election process. The transition of power has not been accomplished by constitutional mechanisms. Violence and terrorism has increased on both sides. The Overall regime stability is categorized as low.

III. U.S.S.R. CASES

The U.S.S.R. cases are: Afghanistan (1950-1989), Vietnam (1976-1989), and Nicaragua (1979-1989). These cases were chosen because of their intuitive similarities with corresponding U.S. arms transfer cases. These cases were also chosen because they appear to represent the broad scope and extent of Soviet arms transfers to the third world. Like their corresponding U.S. cases, the Soviets have supported regimes in order to achieve long term national interests in the recipient nation and the region.

A. AFGHANISTAN (1950-1989)

Afghanistan has long played an important role in Russian expansionist interests since the time of the tsars. From the nineteenth century onward Afghanistan gained importance because of its geographical location [Ref. 1: p. 6]. The Russian tsars through the centuries had pushed their borders eastward across Siberia and southward into Central Asia [Ref. 1: p. 6]. At the same time the British were expanding their empire northward from India. The impending clash was inevitable. To counter Russian influence in both Persia and Central Asia Great Britain fought a series of Anglo-Afghan Wars starting in 1838 [Ref. 2: p. 26].

Time has not changed the geographical importance of

Afghanistan to Soviet interests in the region. The actors have changed. After World War II there emerged three distinct periods of Soviet-Afghan relations that can characterize Soviet aims in Afghanistan and help to explain some of the reasons for Soviet determination to maintain regime stability in this third world nation. The period 1946-1953 represented a traditional balancing of influence of the world powers with the United States replacing Great Britain as the counter balance to the Soviet Union. The period 1953-1963 saw a growing external threat to Afghanistan from Pakistan and required the Afghan government to seek assistance from an outside power. The period after 1963 the Soviet Union sought to lessen the influence of the United States in the region with the emergence of U.S. military alliances and pacts. [Ref. 3: p. 11]

1. Arms Transfers

After the break-up of British India, the Soviet government turned its attention to securing closer relations with Afghanistan. Closer relations with a regime favorable to the Soviet Union was essential to stave off possible encroachment from the West. The Soviets desired to keep Afghanistan out of a Western alliance system. Nikita Khrushchev stated that at the time of his December 1955 visit to Kabul, it was clear that the Americans were penetrating Afghanistan with the obvious purpose of setting

up a military base for intelligence collection operations.
[Ref. 4: p. 74; Ref. 5]

Afghanistan had been historically non-aligned until 1953. Afghanistan and Pakistan were in a border dispute over the Pashtunistan territory. The Afghan government under Prime Minister Daoud had asked for American military aid to update an army which consisted of World War I bi-planes and horse-drawn artillery [Ref. 4: p. 80; Ref. 6: p. 4]. The Eisenhower administration annoyed by Afghanistan's historical insistence on non-alignment, its refusal to sign the Baghdad Pact, and its dispute over border areas with Pakistan, turned down Daoud [Ref. 6: p. 4]. The regime of Mohammed Daoud decided to seek the Soviet Union's assistance and support [Ref. 4: p. 75; Ref. 6: p. 4].

The Soviets, after nearly 150 years of waiting, quickly seized the opportunity to start their way into Kabul and the Afghan government [Ref. 6: p. 4]. In 1954 the Soviets provided the Afghans with \$3.5 million in military and economic assistance [Ref. 1: p. 24]. In 1955 the Soviets dramatically increased support by granting the Afghans \$100 million in military aid and economic assistance to be spread over a seven year period [Ref. 1: p. 24].

Arms transfers have shown a steady increase throughout the 1960's and 1970's with its most dramatic rise corresponding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

1979. The case will examine the gaining of Soviet inroads through arms transfers. These inroads include the equipping of the Afghan armed forces, penetrating the officer corps, building a strategic highway system, and gaining control of the nation's resources [Ref. 6: p. 4]. Table 4 shows the amounts of arms transferred in each year of the case's time period.

Table 4*

1950-1988 ARMS TRANSFERS

(Adjusted to 1988 \$ U.S. millions)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>
1950	-	1964	26	1977	205.6
1951	-	1965	24	1978	222
1953	-	1966	23	1979	786
1954	7	1967	42	1980	720
1955	24	1968	45	1981	953
1956	22	1969	45	1982	865
1957	20	1970	46	1983	625
1958	20	1971	41	1984	860
1959	19	1972	41	1985	835
1960	18	1973	43	1986	786
1961	22	1974	52	1987	1365
1962	20	1975	96	1988	1050
1963	21	1976	62		

*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1973), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1976), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1989). FBIS, Near East and South Asia, 14 April 1988, p. 6.


The level of arms transfers can also be tied to the level of hostilities between Afghanistan and its neighbor, Pakistan. The inroads that the Soviets were making in the

military's officer corps also gave rise to the growing Communist organization in the nation and its eventual rise to power. Figure 4 is a graph that shows the total amount of arms transferred over the course of the case's time period.

Figure 4*

1950-1988 Total Arms Transfers

(In 1988 \$ U.S. millions)



*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973, 1967-1976, 1988.

2. Internal Threat

The period from 1950 to 1970 saw little organized internal threats to the government of Afghanistan. King Zahir Shah reigned from 1933 to 1973 [Ref. 1: p. 29; Ref. 7: p. 1]. Most all of the power of government was in the hands of the Prime Minister, Mohammed Daoud, from 1953 to 1963. Daoud, in 1953 opened the doors to Soviet aid and subsequently aligned the nation to the Soviet Union [Ref. 4: p. 84].

With the influx of military and economic aid in 1953, the Soviets realized that direct military involvement in the country was unnecessary and impractical to counter internal and external threats to the Daoud regime [Ref. 4: p. 84]. Khrushchev realized that there were no incentives for an armed Soviet invasion [Ref. 4: p. 84; Ref. 5: p. 560]. Some of the disincentives for direct military involvement, as perceived by the Soviets, were: the Afghan position among non-aligned Islamic states; Soviet sensitivity to being labeled an invader; and the ruggedness of the Afghan terrain rendering occupation of the country difficult and costly [Ref. 4: p. 84]. These reasons would foreshadow Soviet difficulties with respect to countering the future insurgency.

Realizing the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the reform minded Daoud was forced to resign. The complacent King Zahir Shah took over government. In 1963 a long period of instability followed with the formation of the Communist political party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) [Ref. 1: p. 32; Ref. 3: p. 14].

Opposition to the Marxist government started after a major revolt in the province of Nuristan in the summer of 1978. This revolt grew instantly as an armed insurgency. Most Afghans were now opposed to the Marxist reforms which

ran counter to the growing Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Deep rooted Islamic traditions and fundamentalism also surfaced among members of the PDPA. This created factionalism within the government. [Ref. 7: p. 4; Ref.8]

After a series of political assassinations and jockeying for power, the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal in December of 1979 shortly after large numbers of Soviet airborne forces captured Kabul [Ref. 8: p. 4]. The Soviets invaded partly because they perceived that the Afghan government would not be able to survive the growing insurgency without direct military presence [Ref. 3: p. 19].

The Afghan insurgents, known collectively as the "mujahidin," have grown in organization, resolve, and firepower since the Soviet invasion of 1979 [Ref. 9]. In the years since the invasion, the Kabul regime and the Soviets have been unable to control areas outside the capital city [Ref. 10]. At the peak of Soviet occupation, the 120,000 troops equipped with the most modern weapons could at best only maintain a stalemate with the insurgents [Ref. 11]. The most massive amounts of Soviet military arm transfers to Afghanistan corresponded to the years of Soviet occupation.

After the expense of massive amounts of resources and casualties, the Soviets started to withdraw its forces in May of 1988. Under the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, the

Soviets agreed to withdraw all of its forces by February of 1989 [Ref. 12]. During the entire evacuation there were still large-scale combat operations between Soviet and insurgent forces [Ref. 12].

With the almost complete withdrawal of Soviet combat forces from Afghanistan in February of 1989, the rebels continue their armed struggle against the Soviet-backed regime of Najibullah [Ref. 13]. In many ways the situation parallels the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Mujahideen receive large amounts of military assistance from the U.S. The rebels use high-tech weaponry and the terrain to their advantage. Like the regimes in Saigon, the Kabul regime, even with massive amounts of Soviet arms and aid, still has no real control over the countryside. In fighting the insurgency, the Soviets have failed to yield to their own warnings and apprehensions about direct combat involvement realized long ago in 1954.

3. External Threat

The greatest external threat to Afghanistan has been from its neighbor, Pakistan. Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased during the 1950's because of the Pushtun issue. Prime Minister Daoud's efforts to establish a Pushtun state along the Afghan-Pakistan border resulted in border clashes and tension between the two Islamic states [Ref. 1: p. 24; Ref. 8; Ref. 14].

After the Eisenhower administration rejected the Afghan government's urgent requests for aid, the Daoud regime turned to the Soviet Union. This turn toward the Soviet Union was given further impetus when the United States decided to send military and economic aid to Pakistan, a nation that joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955. The Afghan government viewed the United States as clearly taking the side of its enemy. [Ref. 1: p. 24; Ref. 15]

During the period of the 1950's and the 1960's the Soviets capitalized on the threat of Pakistan in order to gain inroads and to directly influence the Daoud and subsequent Kabul regimes [Ref. 4; p. 84; Ref. 16]. The influx of Soviet military equipment and training during the 1960's and 1970's enhanced the capabilities of the Afghan armed forces against possible aggression from Pakistan [Ref. 17: p. 4].

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan tension between the Afghan government and the Pakistanis persisted. Pakistan became the destination of countless refugees. Many border areas inside Pakistan served as small bases for Afghan insurgents and most importantly as supply depots for weapons from the West [Ref. 17: p. 16-18].

Under United Nations mediation the Pakistan-Afghan

peace accord was signed in April 1988. After six years of indirect talks the two nations with the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed on the accords. Two of the four main clauses cover the voluntary return to Afghanistan of its refugees and a bi-lateral agreement on mutual non-interference and non-intervention. Even after the Soviet withdrawal of troops in February 1989, the insurgents have continued to use areas along the Pakistani border for bases of operations and access to military supplies from the U.S. [Ref. 18, 19]

4. Regime Stability

The period of the 1950's saw the beginning of Soviet involvement in the Afghan government. The regime of Prime Minister Daoud secured Soviet military and economic assistance that continued to grow as the Soviets increased their inroads in the Afghan government. Daoud was a reformist and nationalist who favored the establishment of a Pushtun state along the Pakistani border. This resulted in the increase of clashes and tensions with the U.S. backed Pakistan government. Daoud was eventually dismissed by King Zahir Shah in 1963. [Ref. 6: p. 4]

King Zahir promulgated a new Constitution in 1964 that liberalized much of Afghan politics and eventually led to a long period of political instability under the King's "New Democracy" [Ref. 17: p. 6]. Zahir's attempt at democracy produced few lasting reforms but resulted in the

evolution of various left-wing Marxist groups and right-wing Muslim fundamentalists factions [Ref. 17: p. 6]. The Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) formed in 1965 [Ref. 8: p. 4]. The period of the late 1960's saw the emergence of the Communist PDPA with the backing of the Soviets [Ref. 20].

The early 1970's found Afghanistan in economic ruin and political chaos. The regime of King Zahir was ineffective and corrupt. In a near bloodless coup former Prime Minister Daoud seized power on July 17, 1973. Daoud abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as President and Prime Minister. [Ref. 8, 21, 22]

The Daoud regime did little to achieve economic reforms or maintain political stability [Ref. 17: p. 6; Ref. 21, 22]. In April 1978 with firm backing of the pro-Soviet Afghan officer corps, Daoud was assassinated in a bloody coup [Ref. 21, 22]. Daoud had increasingly sought to loosen the ties formed by Moscow's growing military and economic assistance [Ref. 22, 23]. The government was now under the control of the Communist PDPA leader, Mohammad Taraki who immediately established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [Ref. 17: p. 8; Ref. 22, 23].

Even though the government was under the control of the Communist PDPA, factions grew within the party. The PDPA

was increasingly plagued with widespread mutinies and desertions in the Afghan army. The loyalties of the officer corps was split between Taraki and his rival, Hafizullah Amin. In September 1979, Amin murdered Taraki and purged the government of all of his followers. [Ref. 1: p. 17; Ref. 17: p. 8; Ref. 24]

Established in early 1975, a small band of Afghan Fundamentalists formed the Afghan Resistance [Ref. 17; p. 8]. The insurgency spread throughout the countryside. The Afghan army was faced with nothing less than a civil war by September of 1979 [Ref. 1: p. 52; Ref. 24, 25]. The survival of the regime depended on Soviet military equipment and advisers [Ref. 8].

The Soviet invasion occurred on the night of December 24, 1979 with the landing of large numbers of Soviet airborne forces in Kabul [Ref. 26]. On December 27 Amin was killed and Barak Karmal was placed in power [Ref. 26]. In a real sense, the Soviet invasion and take over of the government was evidence that arms transfers had failed to ensure regime stability. No matter who the Soviets placed in power, the regime would not survive without an invasion of Soviet forces [Ref. 1: p. 91].

In May 1986, Babrak was replaced by Najibullah, former chief of the Afghan secret police [Ref. 8: p. 4; Ref. 27]. In May of 1986, with ever increasing arms transfers

from the Soviet Union, the insurgency still controlled the countryside [Ref. 28]. Arms transfers to the Kabul regime ensured Soviet control of the Afghan armed forces.

The Soviet forces in Afghanistan reached over 120,000 combat troops. Soviet forces withdrew combat forces by February 1989 but large scale fighting was still taking place throughout the country between government forces and insurgents [Ref. 13]. In early March of 1989, Najibullah survived a failed coup attempt launched by his Defense Minister, General Tanay [Ref. 19, 29].

Soviet arms transfers parallels the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Early in the involvement, arms transfers allowed the Afghans to fight the rebels. Later came the "Sovietization" of the war. After the Soviet withdrawal, the war was back in the hands of the Kabul regime.

5. Case Assessment

The period of the 1950's saw the emergence of Soviet arms transfers in response to Afghan request for military assistance to counter the external threat from Pakistan. The amount of arms transfers were consistent throughout the 1950's to the mid-1960's. The Soviets continued to gain inroads in all aspects of Afghan government and in particular, its officer corps. The internal threat rose dramatically during the Soviet occupation of the country during the 1980's. The Najibullah regime continues to face a

potent insurgency, factionalized military, political opposition, and a weak economy. The internal threat is categorized as high.

Historically, Afghanistan's external threat has been from its neighbors, Pakistan. The dispute between the two neighbors has been over boundaries and ethnic territories. Both nations signed a peace accord in 1988 but Pakistan border areas continue to be used for insurgent bases of operations and as a supply route for arms from the West. Direct military confrontations on a large scale is unlikely between the Afghans and the Pakistanis. The overall external threat is categorized as low.

Ironically, the man who opened the flood gates for Soviet military and economic aid in 1953 was killed in a coup backed by the Soviets in 1978. The emergence of the Communist PDPA eventually secured the Soviet foothold on the Afghan government. But the PDPA was plagued with factionalism and ineffectiveness in government. The Marxist orientation of the PDPA with its programs and reforms has run contrary to traditional Muslim Fundamentalists. No regime has been able to unite the nation and achieve any kind of lasting economic or social progress. Each regime supported or placed into power by the Soviets has faced the same problems of instability. The overall regime stability is categorized as low.

B. VIETNAM (1976-1989)

In the years immediately following the fall of Saigon in April of 1975, the Soviet Union and the new unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) moved toward closer relations. Throughout the years of Vietnam's struggle for conquest of the south, the Soviet Union supplied the Hanoi regime with enormous amounts of military and economic aid [Ref. 30: p. 180]. The relationship that has evolved from that support has been based mainly on Soviet opportunism and Vietnamese dependence [Ref. 30: p. 82].

Moscow's postwar motives in Indochina have been intended to serve a broad scope of strategic objectives. The Soviet Union wants to bind Vietnam in a firm alliance to ensure long term returns from its huge military and economic aid investments. In this regard, the primary objective of the Soviet Union's support for the maintenance of regime stability in Hanoi is to counter Chinese influence and hegemonism in Southeast Asia [Ref. 30: p. 67; Ref. 31: p. 4; Ref. 32: p. 1].

The Soviet Union's relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) has often been turbulent and hostile. Much of the hostilities center around border disputes along the Amur river in the northeastern part of China. Both the Soviets and the Chinese invest large numbers of personnel and materiel in defending these borders. The Soviets seek to

make the SRV strong both economically and military. By doing so, the Soviets hope to make a reliable and formidable ally of the SRV. The SRV with the fourth largest standing army in the world is strategically located on the PRC's southern flank. [Ref. 32: p. 7]

1. Arms Transfers

The Soviet Union, along with the PRC and other Communist nations, has been Hanoi's source of weapons since the days of the struggle against French colonialism [Ref. 33]. Since the end of the Vietnam War the Soviet Union has continued to be the SRV's main source of arms. Table 5 shows the amounts of arms transferred in each year of the case's time period.

Table 5*

1976-1989 ARMS TRANSFERS

(In 1989 \$ U.S. millions)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>
1976	157	1981	1447	1986	2279
1977	183	1982	1729	1987	1249
1978	684	1983	1784	1988	1050
1979	5347	1984	1835	1989	534
1980	3315	1985	1671		

*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1988 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1989). FBIS, East Asia, 15 March 1990.


The levels of arms transfers saw a dramatic increase with the 1979 peak. This peak corresponded to Soviet arms transfers for the support of SRV's invasion of Kampuchea and

the SRV's brief but intense border war with the PRC [Ref. 34]. Both events occurred in the opening months of 1979. Figure 5 is a graph showing the trend in the total amounts of arms transferred over the course of the case's time period.

Figure 5*

1976-1989 Total Arms Transfers

(In 1989 \$ U.S. millions)



*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1988. FBIS, East Asia, 15 March 1990.

2. Internal Threat

The SRV's major internal problems are closely related to its economic and political problems [Ref. 31: p. 8]. The Hanoi regime won their thirty year struggle in the Vietnam War because they were able to mobilize the entire population for their cause. But since their victory the Hanoi regime has failed to receive the full backing of the people, particularly those in the south [Ref. 31: p. 8].

The primary internal threat to the Hanoi regime has

been the the country's disastrous economic condition [Ref. 35: p. 9]. The people's feelings and behavior have had an important impact on the entire situation. Thousands of Vietnamese, particularly from the south, have risked their lives to leave the country at any price. Others have joined a small but unorganized armed resistance movement against the Communist government within the country [Ref. 31: p. 11]. Dissatisfaction and disillusion about the Communist regime along with the lack of incentives have been and still are among the major causes of the Hanoi regime's failure to achieve economic progress [Ref. 32: p. 15].

Soviet economic aid and the Hanoi regime's implementation of development plans may curb in the long run the growing internal hostility. The Hanoi regime continues to maintain a firm hold on all political power. Unlike the old Saigon regime, the government in Hanoi maintains control of the entire country not just the areas surrounding the capital.

3. External Threat

The period that represented the largest amounts of Soviet arms transfers corresponded to the SRV's armed conflicts with their two greatest external threats: Kampuchea and the PRC. Both of these major conflicts occurred in early 1979.

The government of Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge

maintained deep rooted and historical animosities against the Vietnamese. Apart from ethnic and historical conflicts, Kampuchea and the SRV had acute differences over border demarcations, off-shore island claims, ideological conflicts, and the massive influx of refugees into the SRV due to the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime [Ref. 36: p. 21].

The government of Kampuchea, backed by the PRC, conducted major clashes along the border against SRV forces throughout the late 1970's. By January of 1978, Vietnamese troops had penetrated to within sixty miles of the Kampuchean capital of Phnom Penh, but soon withdrew partly due to threats of direct PRC retaliation [Ref. 37].

On 25 December 1979, led by twelve divisions fully equipped by the Soviet Union, the SRV launched a blitzkrieg into Kampuchea and by 4 January captured Phnom Penh and forced out the Pol Pot regime [Ref. 38]. The SRV placed into power Heng Samrin backed by an occupation force of nearly 50,000 troops [Ref. 39].

Tension along the SRV-PRC border were high during the entire time leading to the SRV invasion of Kampuchea. In a major threat to the Hanoi regime, the PRC decided to "teach" Vietnam a lesson after SRV troops forcefully displaced Peking's ally from Phnom Penh [Ref. 36: p. 23; Ref. 40; Ref. 41: p. 2]. On 17 February the PRC launched a

five-pronged attack along the PRC-SRV border with 300,000 troops [Ref. 41: p. 18]. The PRC greatly underestimated the strength of the Vietnamese military [Ref. 42]. The PRC believed it could capture Hanoi in one week [Ref. 42]. On 16 March the PRC began its withdrawal of troops from inside Vietnam. Though sources vary somewhat, in nearly a month of fighting the PRC suffered 26,000 troops killed in action while the SRV lost some 30,000 troops [Ref. 43]. The major reasons for the PRC's withdrawal were the realization of the enormous costs of a protracted war with the SRV both economically and politically, and the realization that little could actually be achieved by "taking Hanoi" [Ref. 41: p. 24]. Border tensions between the PRC and the SRV remained high through 1989.

Since the occupation of Kampuchea in 1979, the major external threat to the Hanoi regime remains the long insurgent war with rival guerrilla factions seeking the liberation of Kampuchea. From the invasion of 1979 until the first troop withdrawals in early 1988, the SRV has lost some 55,000 troops killed in action [Ref. 44]. Vietnam in Kampuchea has been likened to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan [Ref. 45]. The occupation is a "no-win" situation in the military sense and imposes a tremendous economic drain on a nation that can not even provide for its own development [Ref. 45]. Though the SRV has announced

the eventual withdrawal of its occupation forces, fighting continues in Kampuchea [Ref. 46].

4. Regime Stability

The period after the Vietnam War saw the most dramatic rise in Soviet arms transfers to the unified Vietnam. The direction of the leadership in Hanoi had not changed a great deal since the earliest days of the struggle against French colonialism. The ruling leadership has been exceptionally stable [Ref. 35: p. 2].

Since World War II there has been no purge in the ranks of Hanoi leadership. The binding force of the revolution was thought to be the dominant influence of Ho Chi Minh and that his death might cause the loss of internal coherence and external credibility. As of 1989 the Hanoi regime continues to be united and stable. [Ref.35: p. 4; Ref. 32: p. 14]

The Vietnam government can not survive without massive doses of foreign economic and military aid mainly from the Soviet Union [Ref. 32: p. 15]. By taking advantage of Hanoi's dependency, the Soviets can achieve their long term strategic and political interest in Southeast Asia [Ref. 47]. In providing the SRV with increased military and economic aid during the invasion of Kampuchea, the Soviets supported the Hanoi regime against the threats posed by the PRC backed Pol Pot regime [Ref. 48]. At the same time Soviet

interests were served by putting a check on Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia [Ref. 48].

In November of 1978 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Moscow secured a strategically valuable ally on China's "soft" southern flank [Ref. 32: p. 7; Ref. 36: p. 25]. Soviet arms transfers during the PRC-SRV border war of 1979 helped to ensure the survival of the Hanoi regime which faced possible destruction from a two front war with the PRC and Kampuchea [Ref. 34].

The Soviets through 1989 continued to supply Vietnam with relatively large amounts of military and economic aid [Ref. 49]. Arms transfers peaked in 1979 and 1980. This aid was intended to ensure the survivability of the Hanoi regime against the continued threat posed by the Kampuchean insurgents and the continued tensions along the PRC-SRV border [Ref. 49, 50].

5. Case Assessment

Soviet arms transfers and massive economic assistance following Hanoi's victory in the Vietnam War helped to ensure the survival of the regime. The major internal problem faced by the Hanoi regime after unification is the struggle for economic development. This remains Vietnam's main internal problem. There is little organized political opposition to the Hanoi regime. The government is

in firm control of the nation's politics, economics, and military establishment. The overall internal threat is categorized as low.

The major external threats come from Vietnam's historical enemies: Kampuchea and China. The SRV successfully invaded and placed into power a puppet government in Kampuchea. The SRV continues to fight an insurgent war in Kampuchea. The war is a tremendous economic and military drain on Vietnam. The SRV successfully repelled an invasion from the PRC. Border disputes and political tensions persist with the PRC. The external threat is categorized as high.

The direction and leadership of the Hanoi regime has changed little since the earliest days of the Vietnam War. There has been no major purges within the ruling party. There is no significant factionalism within the regime. The regime has been coherent and stable throughout the period. The government maintains firm control over the countryside, politics, economics, and the military. The overall regime stability is categorized as high.

C. NICARAGUA (1979-1989)

The triumph of the Sandinista revolutionaries in 1979 over the U.S.-backed Somoza regime in Nicaragua signaled a milestone in what Moscow perceived as the progressive transformation of the Caribbean basin [Ref. 51: p. 12]. It

was a Marxist-Leninist triumph over U.S. hegemony in the region perhaps equal in importance to the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba [Ref. 51: p. 12; Ref. 52: p. 138].

From the earliest days of the Sandinistas' armed guerrilla struggle against the Somoza regime, Soviet support was closely linked to Cuban support. Nicaragua had become "a satellite of a satellite of the Soviet Union" [Ref. 52: p. 209]. Both Moscow and Havana had close relationships with the revolutionary government of Nicaragua. The Soviet government was constrained by their own overextended economic situation and by the realities of geography [Ref. 53: p. 623]. The support of the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua was vital to long term Soviet interests in the Caribbean and to achieve this it was necessary for the Soviets to maintain the stability of the Sandinista regime [Ref. 54: p. 48].

1. Arms Transfers

The Soviet Union, Cuba, and other nations have supported the Sandinista regime with arms transfers since they overthrew the Somoza government in July of 1979 [Ref. 55: p. 125]. The general trend of arms transfers throughout most of the period of the 1980's shows a steep rise.

In 1981 relations between the Sandinista government and the United States deteriorated rapidly as the U.S.

government perceived the spread of Communist revolution in Central America by the Soviets through the Nicaraguans and the Cubans [Ref. 51: p. 2]. As Nicaragua become increasingly alienated by the U.S., Soviet arms transfers grew [Ref. 51: p. 21]. Table 6 shows the amounts of arms transfers in each year of the case's time period.

Table 6*

1979-1989 ARMS TRANSFERS

(In 1989 \$ U.S. millions)


<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AMT</u>
1979	7.3	1985	300
1980	14.7	1986	623
1981	210	1987	525
1982	186	1988	326
1983	333	1989	200
1984	403		

*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1989). FBIS, Latin America, August 1989. FBIS, Latin America, 29 February 1990, pp. 27-28.

The period of the mid-1980's saw the highest levels of Soviet Arms transfers. This time period corresponded to the growing strength of the insurgent groups within Nicaragua fighting the Sandinista regime. Tensions in Central America were mounting during this period. The nearby nation of El Salvador with its U.S. backed regime was in the midst of a civil war. The Central American region was becoming a battleground of East-West rivalries. Both the U.S and the Soviet Union were backing regimes against insurgents and

elsewhere were backing insurgents against regimes. The Sandinista regime was the only Marxist-Leninist government in power in Central America. Its survival depended heavily on Soviet and Cuban economic and military support. [Ref. 55: p. 51]

Figure 6 is a graph showing the trend in the total amounts of arms transfers over the course of the case's time period.



*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1989). FBIS, Latin America, August 1989. FBIS, Latin America, February 1990.

2. Internal Threat

The Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had been fighting a guerrilla war against the Somoza regime since 1962 [Ref. 56: p. 3]. A massive uprising with heavy fighting led by the FSLN managed to overthrow the

Somoza regime on 19 July 1979 [Ref. 57]. The FSLN immediately formed a coalition government comprised of civic leaders, leaders of guerrilla factions, and leaders of the FSLN [Ref. 58]. The government was organized into a five-member junta, a nineteen-member Council of Ministers, and a thirty-three member quasi-legislative National Council [Ref. 58]. The government was in the control of the Sandinistas. They promised free elections, economic improvement, and social justice [Ref. 57].

The government under the FSLN soon ruled with exclusive control of the military, police, and internal security forces. In 1980 there was a growing organized opposition to the Sandinista regime. This opposition grew throughout the countryside. Much of the opposition was being organized by exiles in Honduras and were backed by the U.S. [Ref. 59].

The Soviet Union officially recognized the Sandinista government in October of 1979 and immediately pledged its support for the regime [Ref. 60]. As U.S.-Nicaraguan relations became increasingly tense, the Sandinistas relied more on Cuban-Soviet support [Ref. 61]. In October of 1980 the U.S. ceased all economic and military aid to the government of Nicaragua, partly because the Sandinista regime was pro-Soviet and supported guerrilla activities in El Salvador [Ref. 59].

The major internal threat to the Sandinistas came from the unified armed guerrilla factions collectively known as the "Contras." The Contras operated from bases inside Honduras and were supplied by the U.S. [Ref. 62]. Throughout the 1980's large-scale Contra attacks on the Sandinista forces grew. Nicaragua was plagued with increasing incidents of sabotage on its few industrial sites and government forces were constantly attacked in the countryside [Ref. 63].

Political turmoil within the government also increased during the period. The Sandinistas could not deliver to the people its promises for progress. Free elections did not occur as promised. Stifled by FSLN manipulation, violence, and threats most political opposition parties withdrew from the 1984 elections [Ref. 56: p. 4]. The Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega declared victory in the election and immediately proceeded to restructure the government into a one-party Communist society [Ref. 64].

With the no hope for economic progress, a growing insurgency, increased political opposition, and growing pressure from the U.S. and other nations to settle the civil war in Nicaragua, Ortega agreed to free elections in February 1990 [Ref. 65]. With the Soviets agreeing to accept the results of the free election, Ortega acknowledged his

defeat to Violeta Chamorro in February 1990 [Ref. 66].

3. External Threat

The period that corresponded to the largest amounts of Soviet arms transfers to the Sandinista regime occurred at the height of the external threat to the government of Nicaragua [Ref. 67]. In the period from 1984 to 1986 there were isolated incidents between the Honduran military forces along the border and the Sandinista forces. There were also minor clashes with Costa Rican forces [Ref. 68].

The most dangerous external threat to the Sandinistas was the perception by Ortega that the U.S. would actually invade Nicaragua with U.S. forces [Ref. 69, 70]. This period saw the deployment of U.S. mines in Nicaraguan waters [Ref. 71].

During the period of 1984 to 1986 the Soviets increased their arms shipments to the Sandinistas using a variety of third-party delivery routes and ships [Ref. 72]. The years following 1987 saw a decreasing trend in the amounts of arms transfers [Ref. 72].

There was little or no external threat posed by the forces of Honduras and Costa Rica. The U.S. backed both of these nations. It was the internal threat and Ortega's belief of a possible U.S. invasion that were contributing factors in the Sandinista's decision to negotiate a settlement of the conflict in Nicaragua [Ref. 55: p. 124].

4. Regime Stability

The period from July 1979 to February 1990 saw the struggle for consolidation of power under the Sandinistas. From the day the revolutionary government seized power in Managua, it had to fight to maintain it. Moscow was quick to recognize the new Marxist-Leninist government and provided it with vital economic and military aid [Ref. 60].

In September of 1981 the government of Nicaragua declared a state of emergency after a plot was discovered to assassinate the junta and the entire FSLN Directorate and install a new junta made up of former Somoza loyalists [Ref. 73]. During this time there was a rapid increase in armed opposition to the Sandinista forces throughout the nation. The insurgents conducted several coordinated attacks on government forces [Ref. 73].

As the Sandinista forces were increasing their military strength through Soviet arms transfers, the armed opposition forces were also increasing their numbers, organization, and U.S. backing [Ref. 51]. In 1984 the Sandinistas consolidated their hold on political power by declaring their candidate, Ortega, the winner of the revolutionary government's first "free" election. In that same year the Soviets reaffirmed its support to the Sandinista regime by declaring it would increase economic and military aid to Nicaragua [Ref. 74]. Again in 1986, the

Soviets pledged support to the Sandinsitas after Ortega declared his belief that the U.S. was preparing for a possible invasion of Nicaragua [Ref. 14].

The mounting internal political opposition along with an insurgency that had no end in sight, contributed to the Sandinistas agreeing to a negotiated settlement. The opposition to the Sandinista government under the leadership of Violeta Chamorro was elected into office in February of 1990. Central America's only Marxist-Leninist regime was voted out of office.

5. Case Assessment

1979 saw massive amounts of Soviet arms transfers for the support of revolutionary struggles throughout the world. The Soviets were actively supporting the Kabul government, the Hanoi regime, and the Marxist-Leninist government of Nicaragua. Soviet arms supplies were vital to the consolidation of power and the long fight against the armed insurgency growing within the country. Along with the armed insurgency the Sandinistas were faced with growing political opposition, no economic development, and increasing social unrest. The overall internal threat to the Sandinista regime is categorized as high.

The armed forces of Honduras and Costa Rica were not major threats to the Sandinistas. Both were backed by the U.S. The Sandinista regime did perceive the U.S. as a

direct threat to Nicaragua and believed that the U.S. could invade as they did in Grenada. The U.S. backed Contras used an extensive network of bases in Honduras and Costa Rica to launch attacks into Nicaragua. The overall external threat to Nicaragua is categorized as high.

The Sandinistas maintained power in Nicaragua by keeping full control of the military, police, and internal security forces. The Sandinistas consolidated power by declaring their candidate, Daniel Ortega, the winner of the 1984 election. Nicaragua became a one-party Communist state under Ortega. The period saw a rapid rise in internal political opposition and factionalism. A failed coup attempt led by Somoza loyalists sparked the formation of armed guerrilla groups. The Sandinista regime failed in all of its promises to bring social, economic, and democratic development to Nicaragua. After ten years of massive Soviet economic and military aid, the Sandinistas were voted out of office in a free election in 1990. The overall regime stability throughout the period is categorized as low.

IV. COMBINED CASE ANALYSIS

Both the U.S. and the Soviet arms transfers cases have been presented. Table 7 is a compilation of each case's level of internal threat, external threat, regime stability, and the general trend of arms transfers throughout the the majority of the case's time period.

Table 7

U.S. AND SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF REGIME STABILITY

<u>CASE & PERIOD</u>	<u>INTERNAL THREAT</u>	<u>EXTERNAL THREAT</u>	<u>REGIME STABILITY</u>	<u>TREND OF TRANSFERS</u>
U.S./VIET. 1960-1975	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	INCREASING
U.S./PHIL. 1950-1989	HIGH	LOW	LOW	INCREASING
U.S./EL SAL. 1960-1989	HIGH	LOW	LOW	INCREASING
U.S.S.R./AFGH. 1979-1989	HIGH	LOW	LOW	INCREASING
U.S.S.R./VIET. 1976-1989	LOW	HIGH	HIGH	DECREASING
U.S.S.R./NIC. 1979-1989	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	DECREASING

The compilation of the cases show that where the general trend of arms transfers have increased the resulting regime stability has not been high. In the U.S case of Vietnam, massive increases of arms transfers did not

ensure the regime's survival. The Saigon regime fell. In the Soviet case of Nicaragua, massive increases in the military aid did not prevent the Sandinista regime from eventually falling in a legitimate election.

Analysis of the cases indicate that the level of the internal threat had significant bearing on the stability of the regime. In each of the cases where there was a high level of internal threat, the case's corresponding regime stability was low. This relationship occurred even though the amounts of arms transfers generally increased during the case's time period.

In most of the cases, the level of direct external threat did not appear to be as damaging to the regime as the level of internal threat. What appears to be significant is the external threats in the U.S./Vietnam case and the U.S.S.R./Nicaragua case. In both cases the external threat is closely linked to the internal threat. The Hanoi regime had maintained close and coordinated operations with the internal insurgent forces, the VC, against the Saigon regime. In Nicaragua's case, the internal insurgents were supported, based, and backed by Honduras, Costa Rica, and the U.S. All of whom were external threats to the Sandinistas.

The case that best illustrates the hypothesis that increases in arms transfers increases regime stability

is the U.S.S.R./Vietnam case. The peak of arms transfers occurred when Vietnam directly confronted their two greatest external threats: the PRC and Kampuchea. The Hanoi regime had united the vast majority of their population in a war against their historical enemies. Of all the cases, the U.S.S.R./Vietnam case is the only one that shows the ruling regime faced with a low internal threat. The majority of the case's time period shows a decline in Soviet arms transfers to the Hanoi regime. Since the Hanoi regime maintains a high level of stability, arms transfers may have little to do with regime stability to this point.

The U.S./Philippine, U.S./El Salvador, and U.S.S.R./Afghanistan cases show that where there is a high level of internal threat and a low level of external threat, increasing arms transfers is not in itself sufficient to preserve the regime's stability. It appears that in these cases, increases in arms transfers do not solve the problems of poverty, economic decline, social unrest, political repression, human rights violations, and military factionalism. These are some of the common contributing factors in the rise of the internal threat against the ruling regimes in all of these cases.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has examined three U.S. and three U.S.S.R. arms transfer cases to recipient third world nations. Each U.S. case had a corresponding U.S.S.R. case. The circumstances of involvement of the supplier to the recipient nation were similar. The suppliers believed that arms transfers, or in some cases, direct military intervention were vital to the survival of the regime. It was also shown that the supplier had a vested interest in maintaining the stability of the recipient nation's regime.

The amounts of arms transfers for each year of the case's time period was recorded. An overall increasing or decreasing trend for the majority of the time period was indicated for each case. The level of internal threat, external threat, and the overall level of regime stability was determined for each case. The hypotheses set out to test the proposition that if U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers increased to a recipient third world nation, then the recipient nation is likely to see an increase in its level of regime stability and a decline in its external and internal threats.

The examination of the six cases indicated that increases in U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers did not increase regime stability. Additionally, the cases examined

indicated that increases in arms transfers did not necessarily decrease the level of internal and external threat to the regime.

There was only one case examined that appeared to indicate increases in arms transfers helped to ensure regime stability. The largest amounts of arms transfers to the Hanoi regime during its invasion of Kampuchea and its border war with the PRC in 1979 helped to ensure regime survival against direct external threats. The U.S.S.R./Vietnam case was the only one examined in which the regime did not face a high level of internal threat. In comparing each of the cases, it appeared that when a regime faced a high level of internal threat, increased arms transfers did not help to ensure a high level of regime stability.

The key factor in the level of regime stability appears to be the regime's level of internal threat. In the long run, arms transfers do not seem to solve deep-rooted economic, social, and political problems faced by regimes that give rise to insurgent movements. In each of the cases where there was a strong insurgent movement, as arms transfers increased, the insurgent movement also increased their strength and resolve.

It is suspected that if more U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfer cases were examined the same results would be

transfer cases were examined the same results would be found. In the long run, increasing the amounts of arms transfers does not increase regime stability. Recent world events have decreased East-West tensions. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are facing fiscal realities that would also indicate decreases in both economic and military aid.

There are many other factors that appear to contribute to a regime's demise and no amount of arms transfers will remedy these in the long run. Praetorianism, along with deep-rooted economic, social, and political problems are the factors that most likely need to be addressed in order to ensure a regime's stability in the long run.

So why transfer arms to the Third World? The U.S. lost the Vietnam War. Its presence is not secure in the Philippines. The U.S. is reassessing its military support of El Salvador. The U.S.S.R. has withdrawn from Afghanistan. The U.S.S.R. has reduced its arms transfers to Vietnam and Nicaragua as the Soviets have focused their attentions at improving their own economic condition. Arms transfers at best provide a regime faced with a potent internal threat a reprieve. In these situations, arms transfers only serve to add more shielding to an otherwise fragile and hollow suit of armor. This question could guide additional research.

Further research could explore the relationship between the specific types of weapons transfers and its

effectiveness to counter the specific threats to the recipient nation. Another question that can be examined is the impact of arms transfers to the escalation of levels of low intensity conflict in the recipient nation and the region.

Studying arms transfers, amount trends, and regime stability along with the supplier-recipient relationship provides information that can formulate a more accurate threat assessment of the recipient nation. It can also gauge the recipient nation's level of military capability and the level of threat to regional stability. Arms transfer data is an important element of intelligence that can be provided to the policy maker. In this regard, the examination of arms transfers for the maintenance of regime stability in the Third World indicate that policy makers need to reassess its viability and usefulness for that purpose.

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